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1. Introduction and Key Definition 
 
This is the first paper about academic silencing in Suriname and is intended to 
cast light on a conflict which was given little consideration at the international level.  
The seriousness of this conflict can be still perceived nowadays, as academic 
silencing remains a major issue in Suriname. There are many aspects which deserve 
consideration – e.g., the way this conflict has profoundly changed Surinamese 
society – but limited research has been carried on this topic. For example, there is 
no official data available on the total number of victims. Little is also known about 
the people who were injured, killed, or went missing between 1980 and 1992, which 
marked the end of military dictatorship in this country. Data is also missing on the 
scholars who lost their lives or disappeared during the protests held in the same 
period.  
 
The Hero-system  
A hero-system is a specific type of intervention in societal structure, involving 
individual aggrandizement or iconization, e.g., people who at some point played a 
major role in history. In the context of this paper, the “hero-system” conception is 
based on Beckers’ characterization, namely the «hopeful mystification or a 
determined lie»1. This research considers the following characteristics to be 
relevant discursive tools: 1)  hero-systems are constructed to scapegoat or victimize; 
2) hero-systems are sociological phenomena, although deeply established in the 
psychological dimension; 3) hero-systems are political tools, as they are used to 
build “we-against-them” discourses; 4) hero-systems are fictional creations, 
developed to inspire, empower and amalgamate; and 5) hero-systems are tools to 
generate feelings of loyalty and allegiance to the nation.  
 
Ethnification 
Ethnification is a typology used to characterize societies in which: 1) ethnicity 
marks all aspects of social, political, and cultural life; 2) identity issues (race, 
heritage, the old country, color, kinship, culture) seek political support; and 3) 
identity issues are used as a tool for obtaining and maintaining power.  
 
Verbroedering (Politics of Fraternization) 
The term verbroedering or “politics of fraternization” refers to the inter-ethnic 
cooperation between the two largest ethnic groups in Suriname, Hindustani, and 
Creole, between 1958 and 1967. The term verbroedering is concerned with how the 
personal friendship between the Creole leader of the National Progressive Party 
(NPS) Johan Adolf Pengel, and the Hindustani leader of the Progressive Reform 
Party (VHP), Jagernath Lachmon, gave rise to political cooperation in the 
parliament. In reality, in that period Suriname was governed by a majoritarian 
government, because the Catholic Progressive Peoples Party (PSV) and the 
                                                 
1 E. Becker, The Denial of Death, Free Press Paperbacks, published by Simon and Schuster, 1973. 
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Javanese Kerukanan Tulodo Pranatan Inggil (Party for National Unity and 
Solidarity or KTPI) joined the coalition.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
In his seminal work On Democracy2, Robert Dahl does not speak of 
democracies. He instead uses the term “polyarchy” – which means “government by 
many” – to explain that democracy is a perpetual work in progress. What is the 
connection between polyarchy and the concept of “academic freedom”? The link 
between them originates from the fact that academic freedom is typically viewed as 
an attribute of democracy. Is academic freedom indeed the product of democracy? 
Or is this connection based on flawed notions grounded in Weberian paradigms? 
The purpose of this essay is to examine academic silencing adopting an empirical 
perspective, as one cannot discuss academic silencing without knowing how 
academic freedom works in practice. Can one presume that academic freedom on 
the one hand, and academic silencing on the other hand, are two mutually exclusive 
concepts? And if so, how do they deviate? The other question that needs answering 
is: if academic freedom is linked to democratic freedom and liberalism, is academic 
silencing nothing but a derivative of authoritarianism?  
To understand how both conceptions work in practice, the second part of this 
essay is organized around the examination of academic silencing in Suriname 
during the military regime, and the rise of Anton de Kom as the leader of the 
Revolution during that period (1980-1987). I will address several issues, focusing 
on the following questions:  
1) What affected the construction of the presupposed hero-system?  
2) Why was the “iconization” of Anton de Kom contentious?  
3) What are the attributes of academic silencing in Suriname? 
In the last part of this paper, it is argued that in the 1980s academic silencing 
developed. This phenomenon contributed to identifying Anton de Kom as a symbol 
of the Dutch resistance and Black Power after 2010. 
By positioning the hero-system in the Netherlands as a contrasting variant, it is 
expected to look at the relevance of academic research when searching for the truth 
and on the impact of academic silencing on intellectual bias. 
In the Netherlands, the hero-system of de Kom is based on the black-white racial 
binary. Was the iconization of de Kom in the Netherlands part of a strategy to help 
bridge the social and cultural divide between the following dichotomies, namely 
white people and black people, traditional culture and urban-black culture, 
scholarship and Black Power radicalism?   
 
 
 
                                                 
2 R.A. Dahl, On Democracy, Yale University Press, 1988. 
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3. Academic Freedom and Academic Silencing 
 
In 2001, the Dutch Prince Willem Alexander referred to research by Michael 
Baud about the human rights violations committed by the Videla regime in 
Argentina as “just an opinion”. The Prince of the Netherlands, a high-ranking public 
figure, tried to silence Baud by degrading his academic work. The Dutch Prime 
Minister, Wim Kok, launched a warning sign, but the damage was done3. The 
discrediting of Prof. Baud is seen as a watershed moment for Dutch modern culture. 
It set the tone for the current fraught relationship between the public and academia 
in the Netherlands. The COVID-19 pandemic, for example, has taken this unsavory 
vernacular to new heights. Today, scientific evidence on the Sars-CoV-19 is put 
into question by laypeople: in some circles, proven facts about this lethal virus are 
called “just a case of flu”. Conspiracy theories voiced by social influencers and 
political conservatives undermine vaccination programs, threaten scientists in the 
USA, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 
Hoepner writes that «Academic freedom, is contingent and subject to the players 
in the field»4. Who are the “players in the field”? Is Hoepner referring to those 
players outside5 the walls of the academia in her thesis? Are they politicians, or the 
Vox Populi who see Facebook and Twitter as credible sources of information? Or 
is she speaking about the players inside academia, e.g., administrators, academic 
supervisors, or heads of faculty with the power to gag and silence? Who determines 
who can write or examine what and when? 
Using dead embryos to harvest stem cells to help cure cancer and multiple 
sclerosis is deemed unethical in many western societies. However, China and 
Russia consider the harvesting of stem cells as a medical and scientific 
advancement. Similarly, cloning humans and animals is not permitted in many 
western countries, while South-Korea sees no problems when it comes to the 
cloning of animals. Controversial psychological experiments such as the 1965 
Obedience to Authority Experiment by Stanley Milgram would not be permitted 
today, despite the fact that Milgram’s situational study was conducted under strict 
conditions and was relevant for research into the Holocaust and ethnic conflicts 
such as Rwanda, Burundi, Kenia, and Bosnia6. There is also the issue of the 
continued ban of Mein Kampf. Many scholars see this ban as contentious because 
they say that it prevents us from learning about the trappings of political extremism 
and populism in the contemporary world. 
                                                 
3 J. Alberts, Premier Kok roept prins tot de orde [Prime-minister Kok Reprimands Prins], NRC 
Handelsblad, 7 maart 2001.   
4 J.E. Hoepner, ‘You need to shut up’: Research silencing and what it means for academic freedom, 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University by 
Jacqueline Elise Hoepner, Center for the Public Awareness of Science, College of Physical and 
Mathematical Science, July 2017, openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au. 
5 Italics of the Author. 
6 T. Blass, The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to 
Authority, in Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 29 No. 5, 1999, 955-978.  
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All these examples provided above illustrate that academic freedom is not an 
intrinsic product of liberal democracy. 
Is academic freedom a constitutional right, similar to, for example, the freedom 
of expression and the right to self-determination? Based on the examples mentioned 
earlier, the contention is that academic freedom is in fact a negotiable right, a 
prerogative. To illustrate, one can mention: the University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill “paper-classes” scandal in 2010, or the college admissions bribery 
scandal involving several Ivy League Universities in 20197. These are two 
examples showing how donorship and endowment can compromise academic 
autonomy and therefore academic freedom8. In the Netherlands, a prominent 
faculty member from Tilburg University used his power and prestige to undermine, 
coerce, and silence students and researchers working under his tutelage9. Recently, 
the Dutch media published about other incidences of academic silencing at the 
Universities of Amsterdam, Leiden, and Tilburg.. The alleged victims mentioned 
the toxic work environment, sexual abuse, coercion and menacing behavior by 
supervisors, and department heads.  
Based on these considerations, one might assume that the concept of “academic 
freedom” needs to be repositioned in order to examine the actual trappings of 
academic freedom, based on the argumentation that academic freedom is not a key-
feature of democracy. Academic freedom is a phenomenon in and out of itself, 
established in traditions, norms, and values that researchers have the right and plight 
to examine, explore and write objectively and, without obstruction from the state, 
donors, or the public.   
There is this prevailing idea that the trappings of academic silencing are much 
easier to detect because academic silencing can be observed, seen and perceived. 
Academic silencing does not occur in an inconspicuous fashion, because it typically 
emerges in the public domain, outside academia. Is it plausible that what bystanders 
observe as academic silencing is indeed based on correct observations?  Scholars at 
Risk (SAR), the network that claims to protect and defend academic freedom, for 
example, use a strict set of criteria to determine if a scholar is indeed at risk. SAR 
requires written documentation that proves beyond any reasonable doubt that a 
scholar is at risk before he/she becomes eligible for support. This strict definition 
of “threat” and “risk” is only effective in situations where conflict and war are 
ongoing. It is challenging to assess risk in situations where conflict is classified as 
having low intensity, or in situations where academic autonomy is under pressure 
because of autocratic tendencies, so risk assessment will be less accurate. In order 
to mitigate this challenge, SAR focuses on what it can witness, that is on present-
                                                 
7 J.S. Berger, S.W. Zwickel, Six Harvard alumni charged with nationwide admissions fraud Scandal, 
in The Harvard Crimson, March 14, 2019. 
8 P.R. Maricocchi, “Analysis of the UNC Paper Classes Scandal”, Line by Line, in A Journal of Beginning 
Student Writing, Vol. 3 No. 2, Article 3, 2017, ecommons.udayton.edu/lxl/vol3/iss2/3.  
9 F. Boon, Lieg niet, steel niet: offensief tegen wetenschappelijk bedrog [Do not lie, do not steal: 
offensive against fraudulent behaviour in the Sciences], in De Groene Amsterdammer, November 
14, 2012. 
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day conflicts in Syria, Turkey, and more recently, Afghanistan. On the SAR 
website, it is argued that resources should be allocated to help scholars, 
practitioners, civil society leaders and activists. But if SAR focuses on present 
conflicts, then what happens in situations where academics face violence and threat 
outside the scope of the TV-cameras? On August 23, 2020, the Economist 
headlined that China is killing academic freedom in Hong Kong. The same can be 
argued about the Uyghur academic community in Xinjiang, China, or the Mexican 
scholars writing about drugs criminality, or the Venezuelan scholars forced to exile 
by the Maduro regime.   
Academic silencing is a difficult concept to qualify, an ambiguous conception 
that typically transpires outside the realm of the public domain, since: 
1) Academic silencing is a personal attack, directed at the individual scholar or 
scientist, with far-reaching social and political consequences;  
2) Academic silencing is a human rights violation. 
Concrete examples of academic silencing are:  
1) Gender and racial discrimination, verbal and sexual abuse, slander, and 
disrepute: loss of one’s reputation and professional credibility; 
2) Forced dismissals, stealing of bylines, ideas, work and/or scientific results: 
loss of income and livelihood; 
3) Imprisonment: loss of personal freedom; 
4) Execution/ murder: loss of life. 
Some examples of academic silencing are closely connected to flaws in the 
academic system. For instance, the perpetual pressure to compete and to be 
competitive (publish or perish); the pressure to secure funding for research; the 
underfunding of certain departments that impedes the quality of research; 
problematic doctorate trajectories due to insufficient supervision; favoritism, 
discrimination, the tenure system that typically favors seniority.  
I want to discuss two specific situations of academic silencing that are typically 
under-examined. The first is a form of academic silencing that materialized as a 
result of the geographical divide between the Global North and the Global South. 
Universities located in the Global North, set up sub-disciplines of sociology, such 
as non-western sociology, development studies and cultural anthropology to study 
the Global South, frequently from a hermeneutic perspective. The problem is that 
said positions in fact negatively impacted the quality of research, because of their 
tendency to exoticize deeply complex, social, and political phenomena. Scholars in 
the Global South typically lack financial resources and infrastructures to conduct 
well-rounded research, while visa-restrictions make it difficult to attend and 
participate in debates organized by universities in the Global North.    
As a result, critical research on political and social issues in the Global South is 
based on anecdotal evidence, with this divide which contributed to establishing 
intellectual elitism and western epistemic dominance. 
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The second display of academic silencing is the lack of diversity in academia, 
e.g., gender disparities and the absence of cultural and ethnic diversity10. 
Universities in the Global North do not welcome people of color, those with 
different cultural backgrounds or with lower socio-economic status. Academia in 
both the Global North and South can become precarious for LGBTQ+ people. This 
specific type of silencing is much deeper because it attenuates the urgency of the 
problem. But the lack of diversity is connected to gaps in knowledgeability and 
prevents the advancement of scholarship and science on crucial issues such as 
climate change, social, economic, and political inequality, gender disparities and 
LGBTQX issues.  
 
4. The case of Suriname11  
 
In 1950 Rudolf Van Lier, in his seminal work Frontier Society, typified 
Surinamese society as a colonial society, born out of the remnants of the plantation, 
slavery, indentured laborers from South-East Asia, immigrants from Europe and 
people of mixed descent (typically the miscegenation of Black, White, Jewish and 
Chinese people)12. The plantation set the stage for an ethnically, deeply divided 
society, fraught with ethnic strife and racial tension. After the country gained 
autonomy from the Netherlands in 1950, political parties were organized along the 
lines of existing ethnic and racial divides. However, these divides also determined 
the transition from a colonial society to an autonomous region, which was part of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The fact that the democratization process was in 
the hands of Dutch Tweede Kamer – the second Chamber of Parliament – 
aggravated existing racial tensions and infighting at the national level. 
Significantly, the Dutch Parliament refused to address crucial concerns voiced by 
members of Surinamese Staten van Suriname (the Surinamese Assembly). For 
instance, Surinamese MPs qualified the high rates of illiteracy and limited 
knowledge of Dutch, the official language, as critical for the widening of the 
suffrage. Between 1950 and 1969, elections were manipulated, causing the 
government to call new elections, and the same happened in 1965. During election 
time, political propagandists typically try to gain support, by beseeching or coercing 
voters to choose their party. In 2020, electoral fraud and vote rigging was proven 
by concerned citizens, who photographed and filmed actions of vote rigging and 
electoral fraud during and after elections13. Significantly, the Dutch parliament 
disregarded proposals by the Surinamese delegation to address the stagnant 
economy, and the problematic macroeconomic deficits. Macroeconomic imbalance 
and economic stagnation also became a fixture of the Surinamese economic 
                                                 
10 See for example: philarchive.org/archive/TANATL. 
11 For a demographic overview of Suriname, see: data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
12 R. Van Lier, Frontier Society. A social analysis of the history of Surinam, Martinus Nijhoof, 1971.  
13 Overnachten in NIS: held of oproerkraaier? [Sleepover in NIS: hero or villain?], in parbode.com, 
September 3, 2020. 
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landscape. Donald Horowitz14, followed by Benjamin Reilly15, writes that 
centrifugal tendencies reinforce ethnic divides when societies are in the throes of 
democratic transition. As the example of Suriname demonstrates, in situations 
where politics is ruled by identity-issues, scapegoating and we-against-them 
antimonies reinforce centrifugal tendencies. Why did the Dutch Parliament focus 
on the organizing of elections, instead of on the strengthening of complementary 
arenas, that is the economy, civility, the judicial, and politics, to help strengthen 
democracy? It is plausible that the Dutch Parliament adopted Post-war paradigms 
on decolonization, autonomy, and sovereignty to strengthen their own position 
within the international community. It is also plausible that they saw universal 
suffrage and the organizing of national elections as crucial steps toward 
democratization. Empirical analyses teach that the low levels of political 
organization in rural areas, typically among lower educated Hindustani, Javanese, 
Volkscreolen, Indigenous Marrons were not addressed properly. In this sense, 
Reilly attributes the teething problems of the democratic transition to issues directly 
related to the colonial and the problematic demographic developments16. For 
example, the uneven dispersion of different ethnic categories in nine districts was a 
typical fixture of the plantation administration that lasted until the early twentieth 
century. One can argue that the colonial institutions contributed to the imbalance of 
the electoral system. Redistricting, as a tool for institutional reorganization, would 
have brought on a more proportionate electoral system, though coming with a price. 
To avoid additional costs, it was decided to design an electoral system in which 
extra weight was given to the votes cast in the center (Paramaribo). In 1987, the 
modification of the electoral system as a part of the third democratic transition did 
not help to repair the disproportionateness of the system, quite the contrary. The 
revised electoral system awards extra power to the sparsely populated districts of 
Sipaliwini (Central Suriname), Marowijne (East) and Brokopondo (Central 
Suriname). The new electoral configuration helped the Nationale Democratische 
Partij (NDP: National Democratic Party) led by the former putschist Desi Bouterse, 
to gain foothold in the political arena in 1987 because the NPD was the only 
political organization with access to war-torn districts, e.g., Sipaliwini and 
Marowijne. In 2000, the General Liberation and Development Party (ABOP), led 
by the former leader of the Jungle Commando, Ronny Brunswijk, gained one seat 
in Parliament as a result of the disproportionate voting system. In 2005, ABOP won 
two more seats, and joined the Het Front (Front coalition) in the government.  
Between 1950 and 1980, identity politics and political populism determined the 
political landscape. During the military regime, class (elite/low class), and 
ideological (left/right) criteria became determining factors. The drastic 
reconfiguration of the cleavage structure – e.g., from ethnicity to class – illustrates 
                                                 
14 D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, 1985, Second Edition, 
The Regents of the University of California, 2000. 
15 B. Reilly, Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies, in 
Democratization, Vol. 13 No. 5, December 2006, 811–827. 
16 B. Reilly, Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies, cit., 811. 
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the fluidity of identity issues. Between 1963 and 1969, the Surinamese government 
used McCartyism to instill fear against communism, to repress and silence the 
opposition, and to prevent the political left from gaining momentum. An example 
of this narrative is the international advertising campaign in the American Ebony, 
in which the Surinamese government presented itself as a beacon of racial harmony, 
and political stability (verbroedering in Dutch)17. Social scientists – e.g., Edward 
Dew18 and Gary Brana-Shutte19 – are members of a school of thought that views 
Surinamese society from a situational perspective, typically based on the narrative 
referred to above. This school of thought is rooted in the USA, and because the 
relevant material is written in English, it is considered to have a leading dimension. 
Surinamese intellectuals, exemplified by Hans Ramsoedh20, Ruben Gowricharn21 
and Jack Menke22, typically approach the Surinamese society from either a leftist 
perspective (Marxist or Gramscian) or, from an ethnocentric perspective (either 
Creole or Hindustani). On the contrary, Betty Sedoc-Dalhberg focuses on both the 
system and its complementary institutions, but typically avoids discussions on the 
weaknesses of the political system23. Can one argue in favour of the existence of a 
Surinamese school of thought which approaches Suriname society from a holistic 
perspective, by building models explaining non-traditional issues connected to 
society and its system? Is it possible that these schools have filled their writings 
with cues and vernaculars typically connected to the colonial era? The idea that the 
colonial narrative is used as a paradigmatic model on which later writings are 
premised, emphasizes my earlier argumentation that universities in the Global 
North typically exoticized social and political phenomena connected to the Global 
South. Edward Dew argues that: «the years from 1958 to 1967 mark the longest 
period of political stability Suriname had under self- rule […] the standard of living 
rose markedly, and government services improved»24.  
These considerations illustrate that during this historical period, the political 
arena was dominated by strong men, social unrest, mass immigration, brain-drain 
                                                 
17 A. Lijphart, Democracies in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press, 
1977, 202. 
18 E. Dew, The Difficult Flowering of Suriname: Ethnicity and Politics in a Plural Society, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1978. 
19G. Brana-Shute, Some Aspects of Youthful Identity Management in a Paramaribo Creole 
Neighborhood, in 53ste Jaargang, No. 1-2, September 1978, 1-20; Id., Back to the Barracks? Five 
Years ‘Revo’ in Suriname, in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 28 No. 1, 
Spring 1986, 93-121.     
20 See for example: H. Ramsoedh, Surinaams Onbehagen; Een sociale en politieke geschiendenis 
van Suriname (1865-2015) [Suriname’s Discomfort: A Social and Political History], Hans 
Ramsoedh en Uitgeverij Verloren, 2018.  
21 See for example: R. Gowricharn, Creole Hegemony in Caribbean Societies: The Case of 
Suriname, in Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol. 15 No. 2, 2015.  
22 See for example: J. K. Menke, H. E. Menke, Decolonizing social sciences in Suriname: a strategic 
view in favor of regionalism, in Sustentabilidade em Debate, Vol. 6 No. 2, 2015, 260-275.  
23 B. Sedoc-Dalhberg, Refugees from Suriname, in Canada’s Journal of Refugees, No. 132, 1983, 
refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/download/21454/20129/.  
24 E. Dew, The Difficult Flowering of Suriname, cit., 122.  
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and corruption. A further analysis of the political system showed that the idea of 
political representation was originally based on the Creole/ Hindustani dichotomy. 
The fact that, during verbroedering, the government was an ethno-specific affair, 
excluded other ethnic categories whose parties were not members of the 
government, i.e., the Indigenous, Marrons, Chinese and other minorities. The 
centrifugal characteristic of Surinamese ethnic political cooperation was based on 
how politicians used the vote to obtain and keep the power. They did so by seeking 
key political positions which were necessary for the economic and political 
advancement of their own ethnic category25.  
The intricateness of the Surinamese social and political situation asks for a 
proactive approach to tackle complex issues that continue to be under-researched. 
Examples include the influence of colonialism after enslavement on the 
demographic development and ethnic identity, and the historical significance of the 
independence of 1975, a period marked by political inchoateness, systemic 
weakness, and institutional decay26. Between 1981 and 1983, Suriname tried to 
experiment with socialist style, direct democracy without success. After 
transitioning back to democracy in 1987, western-style institutionalization and 
representative democracy became the norm again.  
    
4.1 Academic freedom in Suriname before 1980 
 
The Universiteit van Suriname (UvS) was established in 1966, as a teaching 
university. It consisted of four academic departments (faculteiten in Dutch): the 
Medical Institute, the Faculty of Law, the Faculty of Social Sciences, and the 
Faculty of Technology. The UvS was part of the ethnified, political and social 
landscape referred to before. In ethnified societies like Suriname, virtually all 
aspects of society have an ethnic outcome. The university system was also involved 
in this state of play: academic positions, tenure, lectureships, and access to funding 
were all subject to ethnic headcount, deployed to favor or strengthen the political 
and economic position of a specific ethnic category. It is logical that in such an 
ethnified milieu, academics avoided discussions about the system or society, 
because the party could put their loyalties into question. The availability examples 
on the effect/affect correlation between academic silencing in ethnified societies 
are typically limited, but one of the most compelling examples of academic 
silencing prior to 1980 is the Abendanon Rapport, which contained the results of 
an investigation carried out by a specially appointed commission of five prominent 
academics27. This commission was mandated by the parliament to examine the 
                                                 
25 K. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, digitally printed paperback version 2007; Z. Bulutgil, N. Prasad, Inequality 
and Voting among Deprived Ethnic Groups: Evidence from India, in Journal of Elections, Public 
Opinion and Parties, 2019, tandfonline.com.    
26 B. Sedoc-Dalhberg (Ed.), The Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for Democracy, OPA Amsterdam, 
1990.  
27 Rapport van het Nederlands Juristen Comité voor de Mensenrechten (N.J.C.M.). 
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ongoing crisis in the army. The conclusion was that the government lacked 
experience and oversight to deal with a crisis of that magnitude. Furthermore, 
because of the crisis in the army, the situation in the country was “precarious” and 
“volatile”. The commission urged the government to act immediately, but the Prime 
Minister, Henck Arron, ignored the findings of the commission: «Het rapport 
verdween in een lade. En er werd niet meer over gepraat»28. 
The second example of academic silencing before 1980 came as a footnote in 
Tropische Tribaden by the sociologist Rudolf van Lier. He argues that he was 
forced to terminate his field work in Suriname – about female-female sexual 
relationships – after being threatened29.  
These two examples suggest that academic silencing was present in Suriname 
before 1980, the year of the military coup. If this is true, what is the difference 
between academic silencing before 1980 and after 1980, the year when the military 
took over government? Is there a correlation between academic silencing, existing 
social and cultural norms, values, and attitudes? In 1968, Arendt Lijphart, in his 
seminal work The Politics of Accommodation argued that in societies with 
autocratic tendencies, people are more likely to defer and submit themselves 
because they are taught not to question authorities or challenge their decisions30. 
The conjecture here is that autocratic tendencies are grounded in colonialism and 
enslavement, though in Suriname the political system encouraged these tendencies. 
Within a monolithic system, there is little room for debate or oppositional voices.  
 
4.2 The Revolution and Iconization  
 
In January 1980, the government headed by Henck Arron lost its parliamentary 
majority and called new elections on 25 March 1980. But in the early morning of 
25 February 1980, a group of sixteen commissioned officers staged an overthrow. 
This overthrow, which represented the culmination of five years of political crises 
and institutional breakdowns, ushered in a new government that claimed to bring 
back law and order, and look after the interests of the people.  
Political parties and other civil organizations from the ideological Left and left-
leaning bodies rushed to offer their services, to assist the new military leaders in 
their endeavor to put people center stage. The new regime chose three radical left-
wing parties – Volkspartij, Revolutionaire Volkspartij (RVP) and the Progressieve 
Landbouwers Unie (PALU) – to help to set up the new government under the 
                                                 
28 Translation Dutch-English: «He [The Prime- Minister] put the Abendanon Rapport in a drawer 
and (they, the government) never discussed its contents». Between 2004 and 2006 N. Adama 
interviewed 28 politicians, policymakers, and civil servants about the political system in Suriname, 
the military dictatorship, and the ongoing economic crisis for her PhD thesis.  The results of these 
interviews were blogged in natascha23.blogspot.com.  
29 R. van Lier, Tropische Tribaden: Een verhandeling over homoseksualiteit en homoseksuele 
vrouwen in Suriname (Caribbean series) [Tropical Tribes: A discourse on homosexuality and 
homosexual females in Suriname], KITLV, 1986.  
30 A. Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, 
University of California Press, 1968. 
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leadership of the moderate leftist cardiologist Henk Chin A. Sen. At first, people 
were happy with the new regime: the younger generations, because they were 
looking for jobs and opportunities; the older generations, because they expected the 
restoration of law and order. The military, at first, delivered on their promises: some 
of the commissioned officers inspired by the struggle of the Sandinistas, the Cuban 
revolution, Che Guevara, and Fidel Castro started to engage young people, by 
organizing them into people’s committees (volkscommittees in Dutch). On national 
TV, the new regime demonstrated how law and order was restored. Footage of 
soldiers beating alleged criminals or manhandling disobedient citizens who violated 
the curfew helped to win the hearts of the older generation. Jules Sedney argued 
that the readiness with which the people accepted human rights violations was 
perplexing31. The acceptance of violence during the military regime further 
supports the argumentation that autocratic tendencies were already embedded in 
society.   
In her essay Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization, Skocpol 
maintains that the construction of the revolution occurs along the lines of an 
established pattern, beginning with the establishment of a new intellectual order, to 
help to legitimize the overthrow of the government, and, henceforth, reconsolidate 
state power32. The revolution in Suriname developed along a similar pattern, 
whereby the new revolutionary order tried to construct a revolution through the 
pursuit of 1) loyal and obedient “soldiers” to help mobilize the people and articulate 
the message that the revolution was on its way 2) obedient and diligent workers to 
help build the new nation.  
The ambitious agenda to radically overhaul the Surinamese social and political 
system could only come to fruition with the help of an extensive propaganda 
machinery, similar to the Cuban one, or the Belle Lettres by the Bolsheviks in 
Moscow. The Surinamese revolution wanted to inspire, so the new order presented 
as a credible alternative, but there were no Belle Lettres, namely: no credible 
cultural policy that could either emancipate or modernize. Early in the revolution, 
they tried to aggrandize Louis Doedel, the first trade union leader and the number 
one enemy of the colonial regime, who had spent most of his life locked up in a 
mental hospital on the outskirts of Paramaribo. Nevertheless, the “iconization” of 
Mr. Doedel failed to catch on, despite massive efforts on the part of the 
revolutionaries. People did not know about the colonial atrocities and failed to 
understand the historical meaning of Louis Doedel as a freedom fighter and political 
activist33.  
The second attempt to create a hero-system came from the military regime.  
Slagveer writes that the “De Jongens” (“the Boys”, a colloquial term to denote the 
                                                 
31J. Sedney, De toekomst van ons verleden, democratie, ethniciteit en politieke machtsvorming in 
Suriname [The future of Our  Past, democratization, ethnicity, and political power in Suriname], 
Vaco NV., Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1997. 
32 T. Skocpol, Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization, in World Politics, Vol. 40  No. 
2, 1988. 
33 E. Klinkers, Groniek, 2011, jdbsc.rug.nl  
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new regime), drew inspiration for the overthrow from three Marron freedom 
fighters, Baron, Boni and Joli Coeur34. The problem is that Josef Slagveer’s De 
Nacht van de Revolutie is not a reliable rendition of that specific historical period. 
His work is an attempt to praise the new military regime, positioning it as saviors.  
The Surinamese Spring was short. By September 1980, the situation took a turn 
for the worst after two failed countercoup attempts and infighting within the ranks 
of the military, which concerned some ideological strategies. Street protests 
organized by university and high-school students.  Het Bureau Volksmobilisatie, a 
special communication unit, was established to deflect, and to mobilize and 
organize the people with the help of art and music. However, the political 
communication that consisted of slogans, songs, and propaganda, and that typically 
disseminated via state-owned media outlets, failed to set in.  
The messages did not become mainstream because of the McCarty-style 
propaganda. The words hoedt u voor het rode gevaar35 uttered by the Prime 
Minister Pengel in the 1960s became relevant again during the military regime, that 
is when people were confronted with Cuban presence in the capital through word 
of mouth (Mofo-koranti in Dutch). In 1980, the Cuban government opened an 
embassy in Suriname. The new ambassador, Osvaldo Cardenas, and his staff 
actively participated in local cultural and political life. In 1983, the New York Times   
wrote that American diplomats argued against a possible “Cuban Game Plan”, a 
plan to use Suriname as a steppingstone to a revolution in the rest of the South 
American continent36. The fact that the Cuban Communist party sent one of its 
highest-ranking officials, Mr. Cardenas, as its ambassador, strengthens the belief 
that there was a “Cuban Game plan”. 
 
4.3 Academic Freedom after 1980 
 
The is no evidence to support the claims that the “Cuban game plan” also 
involved the transformation of the Surinamese university into a 
ontwikkelingsuniversiteit (“development university”). There is significant evidence 
to substantiate claims that the plans to transform the UvS were put forward by a 
group of Dutch-Surinamese and Surinamese intellectuals37. Strategies to review 
academic provision through the incorporation of Marxist and Neo- Marxist 
teachings were set in motion in the early days of the revolution, despite the fact that 
Desi Bouterse, and Roy Horb, two prominent putschists, in 1981, staunchly rejected 
the idea of a Cuban-style revolution. In the fall of 1981, Glenn Sankatsing, a lecturer 
at the UvS, presented a project to turn the university into a “development 
                                                 
34 J. Slagveer, De Nacht van de Revolutie: De staatsgreep in Suriname op 25 februari 1980 [De 
Night of the Revolution: The Military Overthrow of 25 February 1980], C. Kersten & Co. N.V., 
1980. Josef Slagveer was executed in December 1982 by the military regime.  
35 In English: «Beware of the Communists». 
36 nytimes.com/1983/01/28/world/in-suriname-they-make-you-full-of-holes-man.html. 
37 G. Sankatsing, A. Ten Berge, Moviementos populares y partidos politicos en Suriname, in Revista 
Mexicana de Sociologia, Vol. 43 No.2, Apr.- June,1981, 679-690.  
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university”. The Vereniging van Wetenschappelijk Personeel Universiteit (VWPU) 
chaired by dr. Gerard Leckie, a sociologist, and the dean of the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, supported by student organizations, protested against the politicization of 
the university. The situation escalated after the minister of education, Harold 
Rusland, sided with what Leckie called the “splinter group”, led Glenn Sankatsing 
and Arthur ten Berge. In March 1982, Dr. Baan Oemrawsingh, a professor of 
Medicine at the UvS was found dead. His death is not connected to the protests 
taking place at the university. Mr Oemrawsingh’ murder is associated with the 
failed coup attempted in March 1982, though his death fueled the feelings of unrest 
in the academic community. Throughout 1982, the VWPU, together with students 
and civil organizations, among others Organizatie voor Gerechtigheid en Vrede 
(“Organization for Peace and Justice”) protested against the military regime in 
general and its infiltration in academia in particular. In November 1982, the VWPU, 
together with other civil organizations and the trade union De Moederbond, issued 
a letter in which they demanded that the military return back to the barracks, and 
allow the organizing of free and fair elections. On December 8, 1982, Gerard Leckie 
and other leaders of the civil movement were executed by the military regime. 
Surgrim Oemrawsing, a mathematician and a lecturer at the UvS was also executed 
on December 8, 1982. There is no information available to link Mr. Oemrawsingh’s 
execution to the protests at the UvS.  
 
 4.4 Anton de Kom as a Palimpsest  
 
In December 1982, the University of Suriname closed its doors permanently, and 
in October 1983, a new university was built.  Plans for a Development University 
in name of Anton de Kom came to fruition, and all “subversive elements”, “CIA- 
agents”, and “exponents of colonialism” were removed from office. The opening 
of the university, came with the construction of a hero-system, to underpin the 
revolution that started on 10 October 1983, with the proclamation of the 
Stanvastebeweging (“Allegiant Movement”). The Revolution was short-lived – a 
blimp in Suriname’s tumultuous history – and was abruptly terminated when the 
Americans invaded Grenada on 25 October 1983. The official conclusion of the 
revolution did not affect the plans to construct a hero-system based on Anton de 
Kom.   
Hans Ramsoedh and Peter Sanches regard the act of the regime to turn Anton de 
Kom into the symbol of the revolution as an “act of recognition”38. As the leader of 
the revolution, Desi Bouterse spoke in favor of «a politicized institute of higher 
learning rooted in the streets to help and assist the people»39.  
The fact that Desi Bouterse in 1983 embraced the idea of a socialist revolution 
and communism – after he had staunchly rejected it in 1980 – concerns the 
                                                 
38 H. Ramsoedh, P. Sanches, Vijfenzeventig jaar Wij slaven van Suriname; De turbulente biografie 
van een boek [Seventy-Five Years We Slaves of Suriname; The Turbolent Biography of a Book], in 
Oso, Tijdschrift voor de Surinamistiek, Vol. 29 No 1, April 2010, 14. 
39 Ibidem. 
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geopolitical position of Suriname after the December massacres in 1982. The 
decision to join Cuba and Grenada as the South American allies of Moscow came 
after Suriname was given “pariah” status by the western powers following the 
December events. Therefore, the iconization of Anton de Kom was grounded on 
pragmatism and opportunism.  
The iconization process was part of a hero-system that also involved the 
mobilization and organization of the people, the emancipation of women, and the 
inclusion of those who were previously marginalized. An example of these 
emancipation efforts was the literacy program called “Alfa 84”, an ambitious 
initiative to alphabetize the people having clear Marxist implications. The 
Organization of American States in their second report on the human rights 
situation wrote: «In 1984 the Government commenced a literacy program for 
children and adults called Alfa 84. Considerable criticism has been leveled at this 
effort on the ground that the content of the program is highly ideological»40. 
Despite the ideological reorientation which followed the invasion of Grenada, 
the iconization of Anton de Kom continued through the same anti-imperialist and 
anti-colonialist perspective. Mr. de Kom became the symbol of scholarship and 
science, the figurehead of the “Stanvastebeweging” in 1984, and in 1986 his image 
featured the new Surinamese currency, introduced preemptively to control the 
monetary supplies with the rebels in the east of the country and as method to finance 
raging inflation41. Despite the omnipresence of Mr. de Kom in social and political 
life, the iconization process was not successful. All efforts to position Anton de 
Kom as a hero and a freedom fighter backfired. People typically associated Anton 
de Kom with human rights violations, brutality, and violence, rampant inflation, 
and decline. In 2010, Desi Bouterse became president of Suriname and tried again 
to reposition Anton de Kom as a national icon, and a figurehead of his nationalistic 
and anti- Dutch political platform. This attempt also backfired because advocates 
of Anton de Kom refused to cooperate.  
The Surinamese revolution was a short-lived, but impactful, socio-political 
experiment: after the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the military leadership 
positioned Suriname internationally as a non-aligned nation. Despite ideological 
reorientation, the iconization process of Anton de Kom continued.  
 
4.5 Anton de Kom, the Symbol of Dutch Black Power  
 
The iconization of Anton de Kom in the Netherlands is multidimensional and 
transcend cultural boundaries. The multidimensional character of this process 
explains the development of Anton de Kom as an icon from different angles. The 
iconization first happened at the elite level, with attempts by the advocates of Anton 
de Kom to clear Anton de Kom’s reputation in the Netherlands. After his brief stay 
                                                 
40 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66 doc.21 rev. 12 October 1985, in cidh.org/countryrep/Suriname85eng/chap.8.htm. 
41 The Stanvastebeweging [Allegiant Movement]) replaced the Volksmilitie [Peoples Militia], as 
vehicle for mobilization and organization of the people. In 1987, the Stanvastebeweging went on in 
the National Democratic Party, led by the commander-in-chief, Desi Bouterse. 
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in Suriname, he was branded as a communist and an agitator. The lobby efforts by 
his family coincided with plans by the Bouterse regime in 2010, to reposition Mr. 
de Kom as a national hero. The Commissie Herijking Nederlandse Cannon 
(Committee for the Re-evaluation of the Dutch Canon) led by Professor James 
Kennedy in 2016 concluded that the historical evidence needed for the 
rehabilitation of Mr. de Kom was substantial and that he is the first Black Dutch 
symbol of Freedom and Resistance. Mr. de Kom became the symbol of the 
grassroots Dutch-Afro-Caribbean community, because they needed a symbol, a 
source of inspiration, rooted in the Dutch-African identity. The historical evidence 
of Anton de Kom’s activities as a liberator and emancipator is based on activities 
during a very brief stay (one month) in Suriname in 1932, and on a brief stint as a 
member of the Dutch resistance (1945). The question is whether this historical 
evidence is enough to position Mr. de Kom as an icon and a historical figure.  
Is Anton de Kom a freedom fighter comparable to for example Malcolm X, the 
founder of Black Power? In her Surinam’s Cultural Memory: Of Crown and Knife 
written in 1980, Hilda van Neck Yoder sheds some light on the importance of Anton 
de Kom, for both Suriname and for Dutch Black Power in the Netherlands42. Van 
Neck Yoder regards Anton de Kom as an important Surinamese writer and thinker, 
but not as a freedom fighter. She compares de Kom’s work to other volumes written 
during the same period. Van Neck Yoder looks at his contribution to the 
empowerment of the Afro-Surinamese, and to the country’s socio-economic 
advancement. I want to mention Carl P. Rier (1863-1917), because, as Van Neck 
Yoder writes «[Rier is]  one of the most influential initiators of ‘National- Negro-
consciousness […] [because] he was one of the few writers before 1950 to insist 
proudly on the African heritage of Black Suriname’»43. She refers to Wij Slaven van 
Suriname, as an important, albeit not groundbreaking, contribution to the 
empowerment and emancipation of the Afro-Surinamese ethnic category.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Wij Slaven van Suriname is a «recognizable model of critical scholarship in 
history, literature, and anthropology»44. Its ubiquity and interdisciplinary character 
quality stems from the way the writer used his penmanship to engage his audience, 
and the manner in which he expressed himself to convey his message. Wij Slaven 
van Suriname is written as a pamphlet that decries without accusing, that speaks to 
both the oppressed and the oppressors. Its bellicose tone is accusatory, but at the 
same time appeasing, because the writer wants to soothe the consciousness of this 
audience, the white Dutch man. And herein lies the conundrum: both the radical 
left in Suriname in 1980, and the proponents of the Dutch Black Power movement 
                                                 
42 H. van Neck Yoder, Surinam’s Cultural Memory: Of Crown and Knife, in CLA Journal, Vol. 24 
No. 2, December 1980, 173-181.   
43 Idem, 175. 
44 G. Prakash, Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism, in American Historical Review, 1994, 
1476, jan.ucc.nau.edu/sj6/prakashpostcolonialAHA.pdf. 
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today, refuse to accept the fact that de Kom’s proposed strategy to end colonialism 
is premised on Eurocentric conceptions. In 1982, the Surinamese academics who 
voiced their concerns over the politicization of the university were brutally silenced. 
Today, questions on the role of Anton de Kom in Suriname are still not addressed 
properly, because scholars are still prevented from addressing concerns relating to 
the narrative on which the iconization is premised. The extent of academic silencing 
during the military regime was even more visible in the contemporary period. It is 
presumed that between 1980 and 1992, a significant number of lecturers went into 
exile, and more than 10,000 students left the country between 1982 and 2000. The 
problem was that the Dutch government typically refused to grant Surinamese 
refugees so-called “A-status”. In 1983, Sedoc- Dalhberg argued that «It is important 
to note that 65% of those who tried to escape to Holland after the massacre were 
unable to do so because the Dutch embassy refused to deliver them a visa. 
Moreover, only 45 (0.03%) who successfully obtained a visa received a permit to 
stay in Holland»45. 
The controversy surrounding the iconization of Anton de Kom summarized how   
academic silencing in Suriname worked then and now. Today, academic silencing 
continues to frame the Surinamese academic landscape. Since its inauguration, the 
new university has been affected by political machinations and infighting. 
Professorships and Doctorates are typically honorary degrees, that is currencies for 
political loyalty.  
The disruption resulting from academic silencing is profound: loss of lives, 
knowledge, and credibility.  
Empirical evidence indicates that Desi Bouterse in August 1980 rejected the idea 
of a socialist Revolution and communism. Arguably, the decision to join Cuba and 
Grenada as the South-American allies of Moscow came after being ostracized by 
the western world following the December 1982-massacres. The military regime 
recurred to violence, to scapegoat, and create “we-against-them” contrapositions, 
in an effort to justify human rights violations. 
 
 
                                                 
45 B. Sedoc-Dalhberg, Refugees from Suriname, in Canada’s Journal of Refugees, cit.  
